# Who Gets Credit? Citizen Responses to Local Public Goods

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**Abstract**

In decentralized systems, citizens struggle to identify which level of government provides local goods. This problem is particularly salient in weakly institutionalized party environments, where politicians at different levels of government are less likely to benefit from partisan coattail effects. In this paper, I ask how citizens attribute credit for local public goods. I argue that citizens have a strong bias towards attributing credit to local politicians. As a result, citizens will respond differently to credit claiming behavior by local and national politicians. Local politicians experience a ceiling effect where credit claiming has no effect on how citizens attribute credit. However, national politicians have no such ceiling and can claim credit to increase the likelihood that citizens will attribute credit to them. As a result, both political actors can receive credit for the same local goods. I test and support these theoretical predictions using a vignette survey experiment in Colombia.

# 1 Introduction

In many low and middle income countries, citizens do not have equal access to basic resources such as clean water, electricity, or housing infrastructure. Increasing access to these local public resources is important for improving citizen's quality of life. For politicians, this suggests that helping to provide local public goods can be an effective strategy for signaling political competence and improving their future vote share. Yet, in order for politicians to receive electoral rewards for providing public goods, citizens need to know which politician provides these essential resources. In practice, and particularly in decentralized environments, identifying which politicians provide resources is an exceptionally difficult task (Devarajan, Khemani & Shah 2009, Gélineau & Remmer 2006).

How, then, do national politicians benefit from providing local public goods? In strong party environments, national politicians will often overcome voters' uncertainty about who deserves credit for local goods by directing resources towards areas governed by copartisans (Ames 1994, Brollo & Nannicini 2012). Copartisanship makes it possible for politicians at different levels of government to share credit–that is, to receive credit for the same local good–because voters will reward the political party (Ames 1994). However, is this type of credit sharing possible in weakly institutionalized party environments? When politics is more personalistic, how do voters determine who deserves credit for local public goods?

Understanding which politician receives credit for local public goods–and whether credit sharing is possible– has important implications for political accountability. When citizens can identify which politicians are responsible for providing public goods, voting can serve as a referendum on politician performance. However, when citizens cannot identify who is responsible for public goods, politicians may prioritize their own interests over citizen preferences (Baumann, Ecker & Gross 2020, Fox & Jordan 2011, Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas 2010, León & Orriols 2016).

Most existing theories of how credit attribution can help increase political accountability focus on political parties. Parties can play a variety of roles, including advertising what the

political party has accomplished in order to help citizens assign credit and using vertical strategies to facilitate credit sharing across levels of government (Ames 1994, Auerbach & Thachil 2020, Ribeiro & Borges 2020). For national politicians, providing local public goods to copartisans can help foster cooperation, improve service delivery, and shape voter expectations (Bohlken 2018, Schneider 2020). However, we do not know whether the benefits of credit sharing works in more personalistic political systems.

Given the importance of credit attribution for electoral accountability, how citizens assign credit for local public goods is crucial. I argue that there is an asymmetry in how citizens respond to credit claiming behavior. Citizens have a strong credit bias towards local politicians since local politicians are subconsciously associated with local projects. As a result, there is a ceiling effect where local politicians cannot increase the proportion of citizens who attribute credit to them by claiming credit. However, national politicians are unlikely to receive credit from citizens unless they engage in credit claiming. Moreover, I argue that the asymmetry in how citizens respond to credit claiming behavior affects their perceptions of how politicians will perform during elections. My argument implies that credit claiming is not zero-sum. In other words, if a national politician claims credit for providing local goods, citizens are not less likely to attribute credit to local politicians. If my theory is supported, then credit sharing is possible in weakly institutionalized party environments.

In order to test this theory, I use a vignette experiment on a nationally-representative survey of 2000 citizens in Colombia. Colombia is an ideal test of the theory because there are a large number of fragmented political parties. In these contexts, individual political actors are often more important to citizens than the parties they represent. In the vignette experiment, I vary what information citizens have about who may have provided local public goods. I then ask questions about who the respondents believe are responsible for providing the local goods and how the presence of the good may affect the future vote shares of the national or local politicians. I find consistent support for my theory; respondents are more likely to attribute credit to national politicians and anticipate the vote share of national

politicians improving if the national politician claims credit. However, neither credit claiming by the local nor the national politician has an effect on how citizens evaluate local politicians. Crucially, I find that the largest positive effects for national politicians occur when the national and local politician share credit, providing additional support to the idea that shared credit is possible regardless of political party.

## 2 Dual Accountability and the Problem of Credit

The driving force behind many decentralization reforms is the desire to bring governments closer to citizens. Advocates of these reforms argue that making governments more proximate to voters increases government efficiency, responsiveness and political accountability (Escobar-Lemmon & Ross 2014, Faguet 2004, Faguet, Fox & Pöschl 2015, Hooghe & Marks 2009). However, an unintended consequence of these reforms is that they introduce uncertainty about who does what; citizens struggle to identify who is responsible for different political sectors, the economy, or the projects that affect their daily lives (Devarajan, Khemani & Shah 2009, Gélineau & Remmer 2006). This uncertainty actually reduces a citizen's ability to hold politicians accountable (Baumann, Ecker & Gross 2020). Without clarity of responsibility, the correct level of government is unlikely to be rewarded or punished through retrospective voting (Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas 2010, León & Orriols 2016).

The consequences of unclear attribution of responsibility are far reaching. Low-performing politicians benefit from citizen uncertainty because they are able to avoid blame for poor performance (Fox & Jordan 2011, Martin & Raffler 2021). However, high-performing politicians are less likely to benefit from retrospective voting. In order to actually benefit from positive outcomes, therefore, it is important for politicians to receive credit for their work (Cruz & Schneider 2017).

One way that politicians work to ensure they receive credit for their good performance is by targeting benefits towards copartisans (Ames 1994, Brollo & Nannicini 2012). In doing

so, these politician's anticipate a partisan coattail effect where the political party is rewarded at the polls. This strategy for credit sharing is only effective when there are strong party brands (Feierherd 2020).

In the absence of strong party brands, politicians can redirect benefits. For example, Bueno (2017) finds that in Brazil, discretionary funds will be given to non-state organizations rather than unaligned mayors. In doing so, politicians are able to reduce the risk of credit hijacking from rival politicians. Moreover, institutional changes to decentralization can help clarify the attribution of responsibility. This can be done through clarifying the distinctions between levels of government (León & Orriols 2016), or, large scale recentralization reforms (Beazer & Reuter 2019).

Despite the value that politicians place on receiving credit, it is unclear to what extent receiving credit translates into increased vote share during elections. Proponents of decentralization reforms anticipate that voters will practice dual accountability. In other words, voters will attribute responsibility to actors at the relevant level of government. If this were the case, then voters would always consider which politician provided local benefits when deciding how to vote in future elections. However, even when citizens can properly identify which level of government is responsible for local conditions, they are unlikely to practice dual accountability (Johns 2011, Rodden & Wibbels 2010). Rodden & Wibbels (2010) analyze four federal systems: the United States, Canada, Germany, and Argentina. In these contexts, divisions of power are fairly well defined and political party networks play a role in voter decisions. They find that partisanship, not dual accountability, explains how politicians at different levels of government are evaluated. On the other hand, Johns (2011) finds that in Canada and Scotland respondents can identify what level of government performs different tasks. However, this knowledge does not play a role in voting behavior. These findings suggest that it is unlikely that dual accountability can occur in decentralized, rather than federal, states.

Concerns about whether receiving credit improves vote share are further complicated by

the external factors shaping voting behaviors. First, whether a citizen credits or blames a politician for their performance is often shaped by their own partisanship (Marsh & Tilley 2010). Thus, knowledge does not necessarily align with voting decisions. Moreover, providing additional information about politicians' performance only influences how voters evaluate politicians when they believe other citizens also care (Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon & McClendon 2020). While politicians are concerned about receiving credit, there is still uncertainty about whether this matters for retrospective voting.

I build on these literatures in order to explore how politicians benefit from credit claiming in weakly institutionalized party systems. When a politician seeks credit for their performance in a local area, what tangible credit claiming behavior is most likely to be effective? I argue that the dual-accountability problem can only be overcome when politicians claim credit for providing local goods. However, because of the visibility of local politicians and the uncertainty around multiple actors who can be seen as responsible for local improvements (Samuels 2002), credit claiming only matters for assessing national politicians. Credit claiming has no effect on how citizens evaluate local politicians because local politicians are already associated with local goods provision.

# 3 Citizen Behavior in Credit Attribution and Vote Choice

In order to analyze how political actors are rewarded for the provision of locally targeted goods, I address two questions. First, do citizens know who is responsible for local public goods? Second, does their knowledge about who is responsible actually matter when they vote in elections? If citizens do not know who is responsible, then any reward that a politician receives from providing goods may be a reward for performance more broadly. Likewise, if properly attributing credit does not matter for vote choice, than the actors who provide local public goods are not receiving direct political benefits for doing so.

I argue that citizens' knowledge of who does what is incredibly limited in the absence of

strong party brands since parties invest fewer resources in providing information to voters and politicians are less likely to benefit from a shared party label. When this is coupled with the problem of dual accountability, citizens are unlikely to know precisely who provides local public goods. Moreover, citizens will often receive competing messages about how local projects are funded and implemented. As an informational shortcut, citizens will focus on project visibility. For many, this means they will reward local politicians for visible local projects (Johannessen 2019). By visible projects, I mean new projects, such as infrastructure, that citizens can easily observe in their daily lives.

Since local politicians are proximate to local projects, they are able to receive credit for work done by national politician's at a local level. For example, studies of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs in both Brazil and Mexico have found that in areas where there are more recipients of CCT benefits the mayor's party is more likely to be reelected, regardless of whether this is the same party that implemented the CCT programs (De La O 2013, Rodriguez-Chamussy 2015, Zucco 2013). The local incumbent can benefit because of the tangible changes in recipients lives. Where there is a high concentration of CCT recipients, the local politician receives credit because of the positive effects in their municipality.

Local politicians are similarly able to benefit from local goods provided by the national government. This suggests that the locus of power is at the local level. Due to their visibility, local-level politicians are almost subconsciously associated with municipal outcomes. When citizens are satisfied with local conditions, they are likely to attribute credit to the local politician for the local conditions. This occurs regardless of the local politician's actual role in improving local conditions. However, the same cannot be said of national politicians: Without the visibility to be implicitly associated with local outcomes, national politicians need to actively advertise their role in providing local benefits. As a result, while mayors can easily receive credit for national policies that improve the quality of life at the local level, national politicians are unlikely to receive credit for local improvements within their jurisdiction. The role of visibility in determining how citizens attribute credit suggests that

all credit will go to the local level government.

I argue that this credit bias towards local politicians creates an asymmetry in how credit is attributed. Local politicians, due to their visibility, do not need to engage in credit claiming behavior in order to receive credit. On the other hand, national politicians will need to engage in credit claiming in order to overcome citizen's likelihood of attributing credit to the local politician. This leads to my first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1:* When national politicians claim credit for local goods, citizens are more likely to attribute credit to the national government than if national politicians do not claim credit.

However, credit claiming by a national politician is not sufficient to overcome the existing credit bias. Since citizens already believe that the local government is responsible for local projects, the national politician does not gain credit at the expense of the local politician. Moreover, the existing credit bias creates a ceiling effect where the local politician does not have an added benefit from claiming credit for themselves.

*Hypothesis 1a:* When national politicians claim credit for local goods, citizens are equally likely to attribute credit to local politicians as when the national politician does not claim credit.

*Hypothesis 1b:* When local politicians claim credit for local goods, citizens are equally likely to attribute credit to local politicians as when the local politician does not claim credit.

Combined, these hypotheses suggest that national politicians will only receive credit for their work in communities when they explicitly seek credit. The same is not true of local politicians, who will benefit from being intrinsically linked to all local projects. National politicians, therefore, have the most to gain from credit attribution.

But, while the national politician values receiving credit from citizens as a way to demonstrate their competence, it is unclear whether this credit translates into electoral returns. Even if citizens have the necessary information to practice dual accountability, they may chose not to, instead using other heuristics to determine their ultimate vote choice.

The existing literature shows that, in the context of strong party brands, credit sharing will lead to increased electoral returns for multiple politicians due to a partisan coattail effects. In instances where there are strong party brands, voters will identify a party as responsible for local improvements and reward them across levels of government. The coattail effect can benefit politicians at every level of government- helping presidential candidates where there is a strong local party system and local candidates who share a political party with popular national politicians (Ames 1994). The ability of politicians to benefit from coattail effects suggests that voters will vote along party lines rather than practicing dual accountability and separating politicians across levels of government. However, the same cannot be said when there is more party fragmentation. In these instances, coattail effects are less likely to be effective (Ribeiro & Borges 2020).

Since partisan coattail effects are less effective in weak party contexts, citizens may be more inclined to use information about who is responsible for different goods and policies in order to practice dual accountability. However, I argue that citizens are still unlikely to separate politicians across levels of government. Instead, credit sharing can persist even across party lines. This suggests that multiple politicians can see increased electoral returns from the same local project. This is neither the result of a shared party platform (Feierherd 2020), nor is it a consequence of a wide reaching social policy (Zucco 2013). Rather, it occurs because citizens only update their beliefs about responsibility for local goods based on signals from the national, as opposed to the local, government.

Citizens are likely to connect politicians to projects using both information about local conditions and the visibility of politicians associated with local projects. National politicians, because they respond to relatively large jurisdictions, face logistical challenges maintaining a regular visible presence in any given municipality. As a result, these politicians are less likely to be immediately connected to local improvements. To overcome this challenge, national politicians need to give citizens clear information about the role they play in local politics. In the absence of this information, national politicians are unlikely to reap electoral benefits

for their involvement in local improvements. However, if national politicians are able to visibly connect themselves with the projects, and thus receive credit, they can see higher anticipated electoral returns. This leads to the second hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2:* When voters receive additional information about a national politician's involvement in local projects, this information will improve the national politician's vote share.

The same asymmetry that occurs for credit attribution also translates into future electoral returns: Credit will help the national politician but will not change the credit bias in favor of local politicians. As a result, additional information about the national politician is unlikely to change the anticipated electoral rewards of local politicians. This suggests an important refinement to Hypothesis 2:

*Hypothesis 2A:* When voters receive additional information about a national politician's involvement in local projects, this information will have no effect on a local politician's vote share.

Taken together, Hypothesis 2 and 2A suggests important implications for how citizens attribute credit. First, credit can be shared across levels of government, even in weakly institutionalized party systems. This is possible because citizens will consider both the visibility of a politician and clear, explicit, credit claiming behavior. However, citizens will prioritize visibility since it is easily observed without additional cognitive effort. As a result, local politicians are not affected by additional information, which will only benefit national politicians. Second, since credit is positive-sum, it is not costly for local politicians to attribute credit to national political actors in weakly institutionalized party systems.

# 4 Experimental Design

In order to test my arguments about how citizens respond to credit claiming by local and national politicians, I conducted a national survey of over 2000 citizens in Colombia with an

embedded vignette experiment. The survey was run by Netquest, a survey firm with a strong presence in Colombia, from November 12- November 19, 2018 and sampled respondents from 29 of Colombia's 32 departments. Respondents range in age from 18-72, and the average respondent is 34 years old. The survey includes three components: a pre-treatment question block designed to elicit information about how citizens attribute credit without any additional information, the vignette treatment where citizens are exposed to one of four conditions concerning visible credit claiming behavior and asked about who is responsible for local projects and how local projects may affect vote shares, and a series of demographic questions.[1]

| | Percent of Sample |
|---|---|
| Advanced Education, No University | 57.11 |
| University Degree | 5.35 |
| Masters or Professional Degree | 20.12 |
| Students | 12.73 |
| Employed | 70.04 |
| Unemployed | 11.68 |
| Household Strata 1 | 9.86 |
| Household Strata 2 | 33.10 |
| Household Strata 3 | 37.96 |
| Household Strata 4 | 14.62 |
| Household Strata 5 | 2.95 |
| Household Strata 6 | 1.05 |

Table 1: Sample Demographics

The social strata system in Colombia classifies citizens in one of six strata based on the quality of their residential dwellings. A person's strata is used to determine tax and utility rates. The first strata represents the lowest quality living conditions while strata 6 represents the highest quality conditions.

## 4.1 Pre-Treatment

The first group of questions is designed to determine citizens' beliefs about who deserves credit for a variety of public works without any additional information. Respondents are first asked who is responsible for one of the following public works in their municipality:

[1]See the online appendix for a comparison of the survey demographics to national demographics.

road maintenance, water and sewage, schools, hospitals and clinics, parks, or electricity. This creates a baseline understanding of how people assume politician's responsibilities are allocated that can be used to evaluate their later responses. The respondent is asked both who is responsible for funding the local project and who is responsible for implementing the local project.

Next, respondents are shown two of the aforementioned six public works categories. They are asked to select all political actors who may see improved electoral returns as a result of a new project in each of the two categories. They can select as many politicians as they would like between the mayor, the town council, the governor, the department assembly, the president, and the Congress. This question highlights how citizens map new projects onto electoral expectations without any information regarding credit attribution. The responses from these two sets of questions allows me to conduct within-subject analysis in order to see whether citizens with varying initial beliefs respond differently when exposed to the treatments.

## 4.2 Vignette Experiment

The vignette specifically asks about one of three salient public works: schools, clinics, or roads. This subset of possible public works was chosen because they are important projects across municipalities with different demographics. Moreover, during the pilot of the survey[2], these were the most common responses when citizens were asked what areas needed improvement in their municipality. As a result, these are projects that citizens are more likely to take an interest in and benefit from.

The respondents are exposed to the following text:

"Suppose there is a new {school, clinic, or road} in your municipality. {Information Treatment}.

[2]A small pilot of 100 respondents was run in July 2018 in order to determine whether the respondents understood the experimental treatment and the format of the pre-treatment questions that asked about multiple goods and actors. The pilot also included open-ended questions about the most pressing issues in a municipality in order to better select salient treatments for the vignette experiment.

The vignette experiment has four possible information treatments:

1. The control, where citizens are not exposed to any new information about credit. The vignette ends after being told there is a new school, clinic, or road in their municipality. This treatment mimics the real-world treatment where citizens are neither given information about how local projects are funded, nor do they witness visible credit claiming behavior.

2. The mayor credit claiming treatment, where citizens are told "The mayor attends an inauguration ceremony". In this condition, the citizen receives information suggesting the mayor has visibly claimed credit and may be responsible for the local good.[3]

3. The shared credit treatment, where citizens are told "The mayor and a representative from the House of Representatives attend an inauguration ceremony". In this treatment, the respondent receives information suggesting that both politicians can claim credit for the project.

4. The representative credit claiming condition, where citizens are told "The representative attends an inauguration ceremony". In this treatment, the respondent receives information suggesting that the representative has independently claimed credit.

Notably, credit claiming always occurs through an inauguration ceremony. Thus, I only consider visible credit claiming, where the politician will be physically present when unveiling new public works. While credit claiming is also possible through plaques or press statements, an inauguration ceremony provides a strong signal that the politician wants to be physically associated with the project.

The vignette is followed by two questions: Who financed the project? and Who deserves the most credit for the project? These two questions are separated to capture the possible situation where citizen's may know that money comes from one level of government, but still

[3]Mayors are not required to attend inauguration ceremonies. Therefore, attending inaugurations is a way to signal credit (Cruz & Schneider 2017).

believe a different level of government is most responsible for bringing a new project to the municipality. In addition to the mayor or the representative, citizens can select the governor or president, two politicians often given credit due to their high levels of visibility in the press.

In the second stage of the experiment, respondents are randomly asked about either the mayor or national representative. This randomization is independent from the initial treatment. In this stage, I focus on how additional information vis-a-vis visible credit claiming affects a respondents expectations about the politician's future vote share. The respondent is asked: "How will the new {school, clinic, or road} affect the votes of the {mayor or representative} the next time they run for office?" Respondents can select from a five point scale ranging from the candidate receiving a lot fewer votes to a lot more votes. This question achieves two goals. First, by randomizing who receives votes independent of the information condition the respondent is exposed to, I gather information about how people evaluate the votes of candidates who may not have claimed credit. Second, by asking about vote share in the abstract, rather than individual vote choice, I reduce potential concerns respondents may have about revealing their own vote preferences and instead capture how voters believe that new projects affect a politician's vote share more broadly.

# 5 Credit Claiming and Responsibility

After being exposed to the initial treatment, I ask respondents, "Who deserves the most credit for bringing the new public work into the municipality?" This question establishes whether citizens' perceptions of who provides goods to a municipality change when a politician claims credit by attending an inauguration ceremony. While the survey design asks about three different types of local public works, schools, clinics, and roads, I pool these results for the analysis.[4]

[4]The separated results are consistent with pooled results and are in the appendix. I chose to present the pooled results for simplicity and in order to maximize observations for any given condition.

I perform three separate types of analysis. First, I create a binary treatment variable for whether or not the mayor attends an inauguration and a separate binary variable for whether or not the representative attends an inauguration. The binary variables treat the shared credit treatment as equivalent to both the mayor credit claiming and representative credit claiming treatments. This is useful for establishing whether the physical presence of the actor affects credit attribution. Second, I compare how the survey respondents respond to each individual treatment compared to the control treatment where there is no additional information provided. This allows me to explicitly test what type of information is most likely to influence how citizens attribute credit.[5] Finally, I conduct a within-subject analysis based on how citizens attributed credit for financing and implementing projects during the pre-treatment question block in order to elucidate which groups may be most likely to change how they attribute credit.

## Binary Treatments

First, I combine the representative credit treatment and the shared credit treatment into a single variable- "Representative Attends". This variable captures whether or not the representative was present at an inauguration ceremony for a new good. If my hypothesis is supported, I expect that the representative attending will increase the proportion of respondents who attribute credit to the representative and will have no effect on the proportion of respondents that attribute credit to the mayor. I find support for this hypothesis.

Using a difference of means test comparing all respondents who were exposed to the "Representative Attends" treatment versus the respondents who were not exposed to the "Representative Attends" treatment, I find that the percentage of respondents who credit the mayor is unchanged ($p > 0.1$). However, the difference of means when considering whether respondents attribute credit to the representative is both statistically and substantively

[5] I conduct balance tests and find no differences between the treatment and control groups for the binary variable. I also find no differences between the treatment groups when considering all four conditions. The results of the balance tests can be found in the appendix.

significant ($p < 0.01$). When the representative does not attend, only 5.86% of respondents will attribute credit to the representative. When the representative attends this increases by about 4% with 9.84% of respondents attributing credit to the representative. This is a meaningful change in a context where citizens are unlikely to credit the representatives with local goods in their municipality. As seen in Figures 1a and 1b, the mayor is not harmed by the representative's attendance, but the representative is much more likely to receive credit.




(a) Crediting the Mayor when the Representative Attends




(b) Crediting the Representative when the Representative Attends




(c) Crediting the Mayor when the Mayor Attends




(d) Crediting the Representative when the Mayor Attends

Figure 1: Differences of Means when the Representative or Mayor Attends

I argue that the reason only the representative's attendance affects whether respondents attribute credit to the representative is because the mayor is inherently visible in local projects and will tend to be connected to local projects. I repeat the above difference of means test based on whether the respondents were exposed to a "Mayor Attends" treatment. I find the expected null results. When the mayor does not attend an inauguration ceremony, 65.54% of respondents will attribute credit to a mayor, while when a mayor does attend

the ceremony 66.97% of respondents will attribute credit to the mayor. Likewise, when the mayor does not attend, 7.13% of respondents credit the representative and when the mayor attends 8.56% of respondents credit the representative. As seen in Figures 1c and 1d, these differences are not significant.[6]

## Compare All Four Treatments

While this binary analysis provides preliminary support for the hypothesis that only visible credit attribution by the national government will affect how citizens attribute credit, I repeat this analysis comparing the three possible treatments: the mayor claims credit, the representative claims credit, and the politicians share credit, against the control where the respondent receives no information about credit claiming behavior. If my hypothesis is supported, then none of the experimental treatments should be statistically significant when determining whether the respondent attributes credit to the mayor. As seen in Figure 2, this is indeed the case.

On the other hand, I expect that visible credit attribution by the national politician will increase the likelihood that citizens will attribute credit to the national politician. I find support for this hypothesis. When comparing all four conditions, respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the national representative when they are exposed to the shared credit condition. In the control group, only 6.05% of respondents attribute credit to the representative. When exposed to the shared credit treatment, this number almost doubles to 11.45% of respondents. This large increase in credit attribution can be seen in Figure 2.

However, being exposed to the representative alone does not have a significant effect on credit attribution– while a higher percentage of respondents attributed credit in the representative treatment than the control treatment (8.23% vs. 6.05%), this difference was not statistically significant. This suggests that the national politician is most likely to

[6]These percentages do not sum to 100 because there are always respondents who attribute credit to the president, the governor, the department assembly, or the town council rather than the representative or the mayor.




Figure 2: Odds Ratio for Attributing Credit Across All Treatments

receive credit in a shared condition, without any consequences to the mayor. This provides compelling evidence that shared credit is mutually beneficial, even in weakly institutionalized party systems.

## Within-Subject Analysis

Finally, I evaluate whether the respondents pre-existing beliefs about which politician deserves credit for local goods affects their response to the treatment conditions. This analysis serves two purposes. First, it is an important validity check to ensure that the results are driven by the fact that so few respondents attribute credit to the representative absent additional information. Second, this confirms that the expected null results for mayoral credit attribution do not occur because a large proportion of respondents always attribute credit to the mayor.

In the pre-treatment questions, I asked how respondents attribute credit in one of six different areas. I considered two separate forms of credit. First, I asked who respondents believed were responsible for financing different local goods. Second, I asked who was respon-

sible for implementing different local goods. By separating two different roles in providing resources to a municipality, I am able to test whether the attribution of responsibility changes based on two different preexisting beliefs. In order to conduct the within-subject analysis, I limit the analysis to respondents who were asked about schools, hospitals, or road maintenance in order to keep the pre-treatment questions consistent with the goods in the vignette experiment. This leaves a sample size of 1013 respondents.

There were four questions about prior attribution included in the survey. First, respondents were asked who was primarily responsible for funding the good. Then, they were asked who else may be responsible for funding the good. These two questions were then repeated to ask who implemented the local good. For each question, the response options were the president, the congress, the departmental legislature, the governor, the mayor, or the town council. For the analysis, I condense this into three groups- those who assign primary responsibility to congress, the mayor, or other.[7]

### Financing Local Public Goods

In the Colombian system, each of these local goods is usually financed using transfers from the national government. This is particularly true in smaller, more rural municipalities. Despite this, 24.28% of respondents saw the mayor as primarily responsible while 10.07% saw Congress as primarily responsible for financing local goods.

First, I consider the small (N=102) sample of respondents who saw the representative as primarily responsible. If the mayor attends the inauguration, I do not expect that this group will be more likely to attribute credit to the mayor or less likely to attribute credit to the representative. Moreover, when the representative attends the inauguration, I expect that the respondents will be equally likely to attribute credit to the mayor. Finally, since this group is already likely to view the representative as responsible, I do not expect them to update their expectations about the representative when the representative attends. As

[7] In the appendix, I expand this to consider if responsibility was also attributed to the mayor or representative.

seen in Table 2, I find all expected null results.[8]

Next, I consider the sample of respondents (N=246) who saw the mayor as primarily responsible for financing local goods. I do not anticipate that this group will change their expectations about whether the mayor or representative should receive credit if the mayor attends. Likewise, I do not expect this group to change their expectations about whether the mayor receives credit if the representative attends a ceremony. However, this group should be more likely to attribute credit to the representative who attends an inauguration ceremony. I find support for this expectation; when the representative attends an inauguration it triples the percentage of respondents who attribute credit to the representative. When the representative does not attend the inauguration, only 3.1% of respondents attributed credit to the representative. However, when the representative did attend, this number increases to 9.4% and is significant at $p < 0.01$.[9]

| Primary Credit | Who Attended | Expectation | Expectation Supported |
|---|---|---|---|
| Representative | Mayor | No Change in Mayor Credit | Yes |
| Representative | Mayor | No Change in Representative Credit | Yes |
| Representative | Representative | No Change in Mayor Credit | Yes |
| Representative | Representative | No Change in Representative Credit | Yes |
| Mayor | Mayor | No Change in Mayor Credit | Yes |
| Mayor | Mayor | No Change in Representative Credit | Yes |
| Mayor | Representative | No Change in Mayor Credit | Yes |
| Mayor | Representative | Increased Credit for Representative | Yes |

Table 2: Within-Subject Analysis Expectations and Results

**Implementing Local Public Goods**

While public goods are usually financed by the national government, they are generally implemented by the local government. However, citizens do not seem to differentiate financing and implementing goods. Among those who were asked about schools, hospitals, or clinics

[8]The full results of each difference of means test are available in the appendix.

[9]Due to the number of respondents in each category, I do not have the statistical power to repeat these tests considering all four conditions.

in the pretest, 27.15% of respondents saw the mayor as primarily responsible while 9.38% of respondents saw Congress as primarily responsible.[10]

The results by subgroup are largely consistent. When the mayor attended an inauguration, it had no effect on any of the groups likelihood of attributing credit to the mayor or the representative. As in attributing credit for financing local goods, there was a difference in results when the representative attends. When the representative attends, those who saw the representative as primarily responsible do not change their beliefs about who deserves credit for a local good. However, among those who saw the mayor as primarily responsible for implementing local goods, the percentage of respondents who attribute credit to the representative increases from 5.3% of respondents to 12.1% of respondents, a significant increase at $p < 0.05$.

# 6 Credit Claiming and Vote Share

While there is consistent evidence that respondents are more likely to credit a representative who claims credit, it is unclear to what extent this increase in credit translates into improved electoral performance.I expect that when voters witness credit claiming by national politicians, they are more likely to expect that national politician's vote share will increase but there will be no effect on the expectations regarding the mayor's vote share. However, this expectation has two important caveats. First, elections are large events where voters are likely to consider multiple issues. Thus, while the survey attempts to draw a direct connection by asking to what extent the new local good will influence future vote share, there is still likely to be conceptual slippage where respondents do not fully isolate the experimental treatment.

In order to assess changes in vote share, I create a simple trichotomized measure for both the Mayor's vote share and the Representative's vote share. In both cases, when

[10]The remaining respondents saw another political actor as primarily responsible for implementing local goods.

the respondent anticipated the vote share decreasing the new variable is coded -1, when the respondent says there will be no vote change it is coded 0, and when the respondent anticipates the politician receiving more votes the new variable is coded 1.[11]

As in the above section, I perform three separate analyses. First, I conduct a basic test of whether the representative attending changes whether the respondent anticipates the mayor or representative's vote shares changing. Second, I consider how all three possible treatments compare to the control treatment where no additional information about credit claiming was provided. Finally, I complete a within-subject analysis based on the pre-treatment question "Which of the following actors are likely to see their vote share improve based on a new public good". For the within-subject treatment I consider three groups– all respondents who believed the mayor's vote share would improve, all respondent's who believed the representative's vote share would improve, and the subset of respondents who believed both the mayor and the representative's vote shares would improve.

## Binary Treatments

In line with the hypotheses, when the representative attends an inauguration ceremony the respondents will not change their perception of the mayor's future vote share. When the representative does not attend the inauguration, the average response of those asked about the mayor's vote share is 0.71 (on a scale from -1 to 1). When the representative attends, the mean response is 0.72. This indicates that the majority of respondents anticipate the mayor's vote share will improve, regardless of whether the representative claims credit.

However, this changes when considering the expected change in vote share for the representative. When the representative does not attend, the average response of those asked about the representative was 0.43, but when the representative attends this increases to 0.56. This difference is significant at $p < 0.01$. On average, respondents are more likely to

[11] I also ran these tests with a dichotomized measure coded one when the vote improves and a continuous measure using the original five point scale. The results are consistent across all three measures and are reported in the appendix.

anticipate an improved vote share regardless of attendance, but the proportion who see the vote share improving increases when the representative attends. These results can be seen in Figure 3

## Compare All Four Treatments

The above analysis supports the hypothesis that when the national politician claims credit, respondents are more likely to think that the representative's vote share will improve and that the national politician claiming credit will have no effect on the mayor's vote share. When considering credit claiming, this result was driven by credit sharing. In this section, I explore whether credit sharing explains the increase in respondents who anticipate the representative's vote share improving. Unfortunately, with 999 respondents asked about crediting the mayor and 989 asked about crediting the representative, the samples for each treatment are underpowered. Thus, I consider trends in data as well as statistical significance.

I anticipate that, regardless of what treatment respondents were exposed to, their beliefs about whether the mayor's vote share will improve are unlikely to change. As seen in Figure 4, this hypothesis is supported: none of the treatments have a significant effect on the mayor's vote share.

I expect that in the treatments where the representative attends, respondents are more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving. This has more ambiguous results: when using an ordered logit regression in order to estimate coefficients, the results show that the Representative Treatment is significant at $p < 0.1$. This suggests that the change may be driven by the representative claiming credit for herself rather than by credit claiming. Finally, I find the expected positive coefficients for the shared credit treatment.

Further exploration of the results using a one-way ANOVA analysis shows that the four possible treatments are different at $p < 0.05$. In order to understand what drives the differences, I conduct a series of paired t-tests and find that the difference of means between the Mayor treatment and the Representative treatment and the means between the Mayor




(a) Difference of Means for the Mayor's Vote Share Improving




(b) Difference of Means for Representative's Vote Share Improving

Figure 3: Differences of Means for Vote Share Improving when the Representative Attends

treatment and the Shared Credit treatment are both significant at $p < 0.05$. When the mayor attends the inauguration, the mean response is 0.40, but when credit is shared this




Figure 4: Odds Ratio for Improved Vote Share Across Treatments

increases to 0.54. If the representative attends alone, the mean response is 0.57. The variation across all four groups is shown in Figure 5. The effect of the representative attending, therefore, occurs not when there is a change from no credit claiming to credit claiming by the representative, but rather when there is a movement by credit claiming by the mayor to credit sharing or credit claiming by the representative.[12]

## Within-Subjected Analysis

In order to evaluate which respondents drive the above results, I reduce my sample to only consider respondents who were asked about new schools, new clinics/hospitals, or road improvements during the pre-treatment question block so that respondents are asked about the same goods. The reduced sample contains 1,507 respondents. I then divide this sample into three categories: respondents who believed local goods would help the mayor, those who believed local goods would help the representative, or those who believed local goods

[12]It is important to note that power calculations suggest that there should be 278 respondents for each treatment (when asked about the mayor) and 277 respondents for each treatment (when asked about the representative). In practice, the samples in each group range from 126 (mayor treatment, asked about representative) to 207 (control treatment, asked about mayor).




Figure 5: Mean Response to Changes in the Representative's Vote Share Across Treatments

would help both politicians. I test how the representative attending an inauguration, either in the representative treatment or the shared credit treatment, changes the responses for each group. Using this technique, I am able to better understand who is most likely to anticipate changes in vote share. In order to make these results directly comparable, I use the dichotomous version of the post-treatment question about vote share coded 1 when the respondent thought the vote share would improve and 0 otherwise.

Prior to the experiment, 77.37% of respondents believed that new projects were likely to improve the mayor's vote share. Conversely, only 25.55% of respondents believed that new projects were likely to increase the representative's vote share. Finally, only 22.36% of respondents gave credit to both the mayor and representative. This percentage suggests that most, but not all, respondents who anticipate improvements in the representative's vote share also anticipate improvements in the mayor's vote share.

As expected, all three groups are consistent in their evaluation of whether the mayor's future vote share will improve, regardless of their treatment. When considering whether respondents anticipate the representative's vote improving, those who said the mayor's vote

share would improve during the pre-treatment block were more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving when the respondent attends. When the representative did not attend, only 55.60 % of respondents believed the representative's vote share would improve. When the representative attends, this increases to 68.06% of respondents ($p < 0.01$).[13] Neither of the groups that already anticipated the representative's vote share improving saw an effect when the representative attends. This suggests that the effect is strongest among those who were unlikely to anticipate the representative benefiting from local projects. The results can be seen in Figure 6

# 7 Conclusion

This article provides important insights about *when* credit claiming is an effective way to change citizen perceptions and improve politician vote share. I find support for the theory that citizens responses to credit claiming are asymmetrical due to a strong bias towards local politicians. Local level politicians have a ceiling effect where additional credit claiming behavior has no effect on outcomes. Moreover, local level politicians are not harmed by national politician credit claiming. However, credit claiming, and in particular credit sharing, is an effective tool for national politicians looking to receive credit for local level projects. This finding suggests that politicians who divert funds in an attempt to avoid "credit hijacking" by unaligned politicians (Bueno 2017) may be engaging in an unnecessary precaution. My findings suggest that credit attribution is not zero sum, and citizens are unlikely to reward one politician at the expense of another politician.

Moreover, my results support the common assumption that there is a connection between credit claiming and anticipated voter returns. Just as in credit claiming, the effect on voter returns is asymmetrical. Mayors have a ceiling effect where credit claiming behavior does not improve anticipated future vote shares, but credit claiming by the representative does

[13]The same results hold if I consider those who only believed the mayor's vote share would improve. Among this group, the representative attending an inauguration changes the percentage of respondents who anticipate the representative vote share improving from 47.62% to 65.85% ($p < 0.05$).




(a) Respondents Who Believed the Mayor's Vote Share Would Improve




(b) Respondents Who Believed the Representative's Vote Share Would Improve




(c) Respondents Who Believed Both Politicians' Vote Shares Would Improve

Figure 6: Differences of Means for the Representative's Vote Share Improving when the Representative Attends

improve anticipated vote shares for the national politician. This leads to two major conclusions. First, this finding suggests that there is, in fact, a relationship between credit-claiming and whether voters reward politicians for projects. Second, this finding further suggests the idea that credit sharing is both possible and beneficial, even in weakly institutionalized party systems. This raises questions about why local level politicians often do not share credit. If credit sharing is costless, than sharing credit is a sign that the local politician is willing to help the national politician improve their vote share. However, further research should explore motivations for choosing not to share credit.

Finally, these results are driven by the respondents who were least likely to attribute credit to the national politician. When considering credit attribution, the respondents who were likely to attribute credit to the mayor during the pre-treatment question block were the group who saw the largest increase in respondents who would attribute credit to the representative should the representative attend. Likewise, when considering anticipated improvements in vote share, respondents who believed the mayors vote share would improve as a result of local projects were the group who saw the largest increase in the proportion saying the representative's vote share would improve should a representative claim credit. Since the results are driven by the group that would, on the surface, be most skeptical when rewarding the national politician, the increases in credit attribution and beliefs that the vote share would improve shows that citizens are willing to move beyond their assumptions concerning local goods. For example, if a citizen assumed that mayors provided all local goods and should be rewarded for this action, my results show that this citizen is willing to adjust his beliefs. If a representative claims credit, the same citizen will be willing to acknowledge the role that a national politician played in providing a local good. Moreover, this citizens beliefs will not only change in the short term- the citizen will also anticipate an increased vote share for the national politician. My results provide support for the common assumption that credit attribution matters when voters cast their ballots.

It is worth noting that, when considering credit attribution, the positive effect of credit

claiming by the national politician on receiving credit from respondents was strongest for the shared credit treatment, not the treatment where the representative claims credit. Citizens are more likely to attribute credit to a national politician when that politician's claims are corroborated by the local politicians. Since citizens are already likely to attribute credit to mayors, having the mayor implicitly endorse the national politician's role in providing local goods by appearing beside them sends a strong signal of the national politician's responsibility for providing goods. However, there's little compelling evidence the same is true when considering anticipated electoral rewards. Future research will explore when credit sharing is likely to provide larger benefits to national politicians than credit claiming.

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# Online Appendices

## Table of Contents

# A Survey Demographics vs. Colombia's Population Demographics

In this section, I present tables comparing my sample to the general population in Colombia according to the 2018 Census. In the census, age is binned in 5 year ranges. I include citizens from ages 15-19 to those 70-75 in order to capture the full range of my survey (18-72 years old). Due to the binning, I expect that my survey will undersample in the smallest and largest bins since all five years are not represented in my sample.

| | Survey Percent | Population Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Female | 55.38 | 51.56 |
| **Age** | | |
| 15-19 | 5.04 | 11.84 |
| 20-24 | 16.97 | 12.11 |
| 25-29 | 18.97 | 11.35 |
| 30-34 | 14.88 | 10.30 |
| 35-39 | 14.63 | 9.89 |
| 40-44 | 10.08 | 8.44 |
| 45-49 | 9.64 | 8.13 |
| 50-54 | 8.19 | 7.98 |
| 55-59 | 0.45 | 7.01 |
| 60-64 | 0.40 | 5.61 |
| 65-69 | 0.20 | 4.27 |
| 70-74 | 0.55 | 3.09 |
| **Education** | | |
| Primary | 1.00 | 22.19 |
| Secondary | 5.49 | 14.62 |
| Media | 10.93 | 30.51 |
| Advanced | 57.11 | 10.68 |
| University Degree | 5.34 | 12.69 |
| Professional Degree | 20.12 | 3.45 |
| **Employment** | | |
| Employed | 70.04 | 52.17 |
| Student | 12.73 | 10.79 |
| Unemployed | 11.68 | 6.16 |
| Retired | 1.30 | 2.90 |
| Disabled | 0.50 | 0.93 |
| Housework | 3.30 | 20.03 |
| **Household Strata** | | |
| 1 | 9.86 | 28.4 |
| 2 | 33.10 | 27.18 |
| 3 | 37.96 | 16.51 |
| 4 | 14.62 | 4.84 |
| 5 | 2.95 | 1.87 |
| 6 | 1.05 | 1.03 |

Table A.1: Comparison Between Survey Demographics and Population Demographics

# B Balance Tests

In this section, I compare the treatment and control groups for both the binary treatments (whether or not the representative or mayor attend an inauguration ceremony), as well as

across all four treatment groups.

For the binary treatment, I present two tables. First, I show that there is no difference between when the mayor does not attend and when the mayor attends. Next, I show that there is no difference between the groups assigned to the treatments that the representative attends and that the representative does not attend.

| | Mayor Does Not Attend | Mayor Attends | p-value | Balanced |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean Age | 33.91 | 33.61 | 0.52 | Yes |
| Proportion Female | 0.56 | 0.55 | 0.73 | Yes |
| Mean Household Strata | 2.74 | 2.71 | 0.57 | Yes |

Table B.1: Comparison Between Mayor Attending and Not Attending

| | Representative Does Not Attend | Representative Attends | p-value | Balanced |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean Age | 33.58 | 33.95 | 0.43 | Yes |
| Proportion Female | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.51 | Yes |
| Mean Household Strata | 2.75 | 2.70 | 0.35 | Yes |

Table B.2: Comparison Between Representative Attending and Not Attending

For the comparison across all four treatments, I show that there is no difference between each possible treatment. I report the mean age and household strata of each group, as well as the proportion of female respondents. I then report the p-value of an F-Test across the four groups.

| | Control | Mayor Claims | Representative Claims | Shared Credit | p-value | Balanced |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean Age | 34.01 | 33.01 | 33.74 | 34.12 | 0.33 | Yes |
| Proportion Female | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.78 | Yes |
| Mean Household Strata | 2.79 | 2.71 | 2.69 | 2.72 | 0.45 | Yes |

Table B.3: Comparison Across All Four Treatments

# C Credit Claiming and Responsibility: Results as Tables

## C.1 Binary Tests

| | Mayor Does Not Attend (N) | Mayor Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor | 0.66 | 0.67 | 0.50 |
| | (1010) | (993) | |
| Credit Representative | 0.07 | .09 | 0.23 |
| | (1010) | (993) | |

Table C.1: Difference of Means for the Mayor and Representative when the Mayor Attends

| | Representative Does Not Attend (N) | Representative Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor | 0.65 | 0.67 | 0.39 |
| | (1007) | (996) | |
| Credit Representative | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.0009 |
| | (1007) | (996) | |

Table C.2: Difference of Means for the Mayor and Representative when the Representative Attends

## C.2 Compare All Treatments

| | (1) Credit for Mayor | (2) Credit for Representative |
|---|---|---|
| MayorTreatment | 0.010 | -0.072 |
| | (0.132) | (0.269) |
| RepTreatment | 0.028 | 0.331 |
| | (0.132) | (0.247) |
| SharedTreatment | 0.146 | 0.696*** |
| | (0.134) | (0.233) |
| Constant | 0.629*** | -2.742*** |
| | (0.093) | (0.185) |
| Observations | 2003 | 2003 |

Table C.3: Credit Attribution Across All Treatments

## C.3 Within-Subject Analysis- Financing

| | Mayor Does Not Attend (N) | Mayor Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.82 |
| | (59) | (43) | |
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.70 | 0.75 | 0.38 |
| | (119) | (127) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.51 |
| | (59) | (43) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.51 |
| | (119) | (127) | |

Table C.4: Different of Means Based on Pre-Test Results When the Mayor Attends

| | Representative Does Not Attend (N) | Representative Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.60 | 0.63 | 0.77 |
| | (53) | (49) | |
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0.92 |
| | (129) | (117) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| | (53) | (49) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.04 |
| | (129) | (117) | |

Table C.5: Different of Means Based on Pre-Test Results When the Representative Attends

## C.4 Within-Subject Analysis- Implementing

| | Mayor Does Not Attend (N) | Mayor Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.48 | 0.58 | 0.35 |
| | (50) | (45) | |
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.67 | 0.77 | 0.07 |
| | (138) | (137) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.38 |
| | (50) | (45) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.29 |
| | (138) | (137) | |

Table C.6: Different of Means Based on Pre-Test Results When the Mayor Attends

| | Representative Does Not Attend (N) | Representative Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.62 | 0.44 | 0.08 |
| | (47) | (48) | |
| Credit Mayor, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.70 | 0.73 | 0.56 |
| | (151) | (124) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Representative | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.31 |
| | (47) | (48) | |
| Credit Representative, Primary Credit was Mayor | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.04 |
| | (151) | (124) | |

Table C.7: Different of Means Based on Pre-Test Results When the Representative Attends

# D Credit Claiming and Vote Share: Results as Tables

## D.1 Binary Tests

| | Mayor Does Not Attend (N) | Mayor Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Future Mayor Vote | 0.69 | 0.74 | 0.19 |
| | (500) | (499) | |
| Future Representative Vote | 0.51 | .48 | 0.40 |
| | (501) | (488) | |

Table D.1: Difference of Means for the Mayor and Representative when the Mayor Attends

| | Representative Does Not Attend (N) | Representative Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Future Mayor Vote | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.68 |
| | (523) | (476) | |
| Future Representative Vote | 0.43 | 0.56 | 0.0044 |
| | (476) | (513) | |

Table D.2: Difference of Means for the Mayor and Representative when the Representative Attends

## D.2 Compare All Treatments

| | (1) Vote Change for Mayor | (2) Vote Change for Representative |
|---|---|---|
| MayorTreatment | 0.201 | -0.111 |
| | (0.212) | (0.180) |
| RepTreatment | 0.020 | 0.337* |
| | (0.211) | (0.181) |
| SharedTreatment | 0.318 | 0.251 |
| | (0.219) | (0.182) |
| Observations | 999 | 989 |

Table D.3: Anticipated Vote Change Across All Treatments

**Representative Vote Share ANOVA**

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | N |
|---|---|---|---|
| Control | 0.45 | 0.72 | 236 |
| Mayor Claims | 0.40 | 0.75 | 240 |
| Representative Claims | 0.57 | 0.67 | 265 |
| Both Claim | 0.75 | 0.57 | 246 |
| p-value | 0.03 | | |

Table D.4: ANOVA Test of All Treatments for Crediting the Representative

## D.3 Within-Subject Analysis

| | Representative Does Not Attend (N) | Representative Attends (N) | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Believed Mayor Votes would Improve | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.0020 |
| | (268) | (310) | |
| Believed Representative Votes would Improve | 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.30 |
| | (92) | (101) | |
| Believed Both Votes Would Improve | 0.68 | 0.76 | 0.31 |
| | (76) | (90) | |

Table D.5: Difference of Means for the Representative Vote Share Improving Based on Prior Expectations

# E Credit Claiming and Responsibility: Results by Local Good

In this section, I test if the results from pooling the three possible local goods: schools, clinics, and roads, holds when I run each good separately. Due to small sample sizes in the within-subject analysis, I only repeat the analysis for the binary treatments and the results across all possible treatments.

## E.1 Binary Treatments

### Schools

When only considering schools, the representative attending improves the proportion of respondents attributing credit to both the mayor and the representative ($p < 0.1$). This

is different than in the pooled analysis, where only the representative has an increase in credit. If the representative does not attend, 65.17% of respondents attribute credit to the mayor, but when the representative attends this increases to 71.30%. Likewise, when the representative does no attend 6.91% of respondents attribute credit to the representative. This increases to 10.88% of respondents when the representative attends.

As expected, there are no differences in credit attribution for the mayor or the representative when the mayor attends.

### Clinics

When only considering clinics, the representative attending increases the proportion of respondents who attribute credit to the representative ($p < 0.1$), but has no effect on attributing credit to the mayor. When the representative does not attend, 4.58% of respondents attribute credit to the representative. However, when the representative attends this increase to 8.21%. This is the same as the pooled analysis.

As expected, there are no differences in credit attribution for the mayor or the representative if the mayor attends.

### Roads

Finally, when only considering roads, the results continue to hold from the pooled analysis. When the representative attends, the proportion of respondents who attribute credit to the respondent increases ($p < 0.05$). When the representative does not attend, 6.15% of respondents attribute credit to the representative. However, when the representative does attend, this increases to 10.42% of respondents. As expected, there is no effect of the representative attending on credit attribution for the mayor.

Finally, there are no differences in credit attribution for the mayor or the representative when the mayor attends.

## E.2 Compare All Treatments

### Schools

As in the pooled analysis, only the shared credit treatment is positive and significant for attributing credit to the representative. The shared credit treatment is significant at $p < 0.1$. As expected, none of the treatments have a significant effect for attributing credit to the mayor.

### Clinics

As in the pooled analysis, only the shred credit treatment is positive and significant for attributing credit to the representative. The shared credit treatment is significant at $p < 0.1$. As expected, none of the treatments have a significant effect for attributing credit to the mayor.

### Roads

Unlike in the pooled analysis, none of the treatments are significant for credit attribution to the representative or the mayor. However, the ANOVA analysis shows that the four treatments are different at $p < 0.1$. When conducting paired ttests, the result is driven by the difference between the respondents who attribute credit to the representative in the shared credit treatment versus the mayor credit claiming treatment.

# F Credit Claiming and Responsibility- Expanded Within Subject Analysis

In this section, I expand the within-subject analysis to include those respondents who attributed primary or secondary responsibility to Congress or the Mayor.

## F.1 Financing Local Goods

Among those who attributed primary or secondary responsibility to the representative, I expect that neither the mayor nor the representative attending an inauguration should have an effect on how they allocate credit. I find that when the mayor attends, there is no effect on how the respondents attribute credit to the mayor or representative. However, this group– perhaps because they are predisposed to attribute credit to the representative– are more likely to credit the mayor when the representative attends ($p < 0.1$)

Among those who attribute primary or secondary responsibility to the mayor, I do not expect that the mayor attending will have an effect on how respondents attribute credit to the mayor or representative. However, when the representative attends this group should be more likely to attribute credit ot the representative. Here, there are some changes with the expanded sample. When the representative attends, respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the mayor ($p < 0.1$). This may be because of the 789 respondents who attributed secondary responsibility to the mayor, 91% attributed responsibility primary responsibility to a third option that did not have a possible treatment condition. Finally, in line with expectations, if the representative attends this group is more likely to attribute credit to the representative ($p < 0.1$).

## F.2 Implementing Local Goods

I repeat this analysis considering who respondents saw as having either primary or secondary responsibility for implementing local goods. When only considering those who attributed primary responsibility to the mayor or representative, the results were the same as in financing. Thus, I expect that the mayor attending will have no effect among those who attributed credit to the mayor or representative. However, I expect that the representative attending will increase the percentage of respondents who attribute credit to the representative among those who gave credit to the mayor in the pre-treatment questions.

My findings are consistent with expectations. Among those who attributed primary or

secondary responsibility to the representative, the mayor attending has no effect on how these respondents attribute credit. When the representative attends, these respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the mayor ($p < 0.1$), perhaps because they see the representative as sending a meaningful signal. However, this result should be accepted with caution since the sample size is quite small (47 who did not see the representative attend and 48 who did).

Finally, among those who attribute primary or secondary responsibility to the mayor, my results are consistent with those when only considering primary responsibility. Regardless of whether the mayor or representative attends, this group is equally likely to attribute credit to the mayor. Moreover, if the mayor attends there is no change in how this group attributes credit to the representative. If the representative attends, this group is more likely to attribute credit to the representative ($p < 0.05$). This suggests that the group who saw the mayor as responsible is most swayed by the representative attending.

# G Credit Claiming and Responsibility- Controlling for Demographic Features

In the following section, I analyze how gender, age, education, household strata, political knowledge, voting behavior, and partisanship influence the results. For each category, I conduct tests where I control for the demographic characteristic as its own variable and where I interact the demographic with each treatment.

## G.1 Gender

In the main analysis, whether the mayor or representative attends does not have an effect on whether respondents attribute credit to the mayor. Moreover, whether the mayor attends does not have an effect on whether respondents attribute credit to a representative. However, when the representative attends, respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the representative.

When I separate binary results by gender, the results are largely consistent. However, when I consider males, they are more likely ot credit the representative when the representative attends, but the significance changes from $p < 0.05$ when genders are combined to $p < 0.1$.

| | Mayor Does Not Attend | Mayor Attends | p-value | Consistent with Main Analysis? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor Male | 0.67 | 0.66 | 0.68 | Yes |
| Credit Mayor Female | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.25 | Yes |
| Credit Representative Male | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.29 | Yes |
| Credit Representative Female | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.47 | Yes |

Table G.1: Binary Tests by Gender if the Mayor Attends

| | Representative Does Not Attend | Representative Attends | p-value | Consistent with Main Analysis? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credit Mayor Male | 0.65 | 0.69 | 0.24 | Yes |
| Credit Mayor Female | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.91 | Yes |
| Credit Representative Male | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.08 | No |
| Credit Representative Female | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.004 | Yes |

Table G.2: Binary Tests by Gender if the Repreesntative Attends

I also repeat the comparison across all four treatments using both controlling for gender and interacting each treatment with gender. In the main analysis, I find that the shared credit treatment drives the results. When exposed to the shared credit treatment, respondents are almost twice as likely to attribute credit to the representative.

As expected, the treatment where both the mayor and representative attend na inauguration is positive and significant at $p < 0.05$. This shows that the results are not driven by a particular gender.

## G.2 Age

In order to make sure my results are not driven by age, I operationalize age as a continuous variable. In the first set of tables, I repeat my analysis where there is a binary variable for whether the Mayor or Representative Attends. In Table G.4, I consider whether controlling for age or interacting age has an effect on credit for the mayor or representative if the mayor attends. In Table G.5, I repeat these analyses based on whether the representative attends.

| | (1) Control for Gender | (2) Interact Gender |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.069 | -0.517 |
| | (0.269) | (0.372) |
| Representative Attends | 0.331 | 0.129 |
| | (0.247) | (0.314) |
| Both Attend | 0.695*** | 0.641** |
| | (0.233) | (0.287) |
| Male | -0.144 | -0.529 |
| | (0.170) | (0.395) |
| Mayor Attends × Male | | 1.001* |
| | | (0.557) |
| Representative Attends × Male | | 0.526 |
| | | (0.514) |
| Both Attend × Male | | 0.155 |
| | | (0.492) |
| Constant | -2.681*** | -2.539*** |
| | (0.198) | (0.227) |
| Observations | 2003 | 2003 |

Table G.3: Credit for Representative Including Gender

I find that older respondents are less likely to attribute credit to the representative, but the mayor attending still produces the expected null results. Moreover, consistent with my previous results, I find that when the representative attends respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the representative when controlling for age. However, when interacting age the representative attending no longer has an effect.

In the next set of tables, I repeat the analysis across all four possible treatment groups for attributing credit ot the representative. When I control for age the shared credit treatment is positive and significant. When interacting age, I find that both the mayor treatment and representative treatment are negative while the interactions are positive. There is no effect for the shared treatment.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Control Age | (2) Interact Age | (3) Control Age | (4) Interact Age |
| Mayor Attends | 0.065 | -0.141 | 0.187 | 0.051 |
| | (0.095) | (0.322) | (0.168) | (0.574) |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.001 | -0.037*** | -0.039*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.013) |
| Mayor Attends × Age | | 0.006 | | 0.004 |
| | | (0.009) | | (0.018) |
| Constant | 0.494*** | 0.598*** | -1.366*** | -1.291*** |
| | (0.168) | (0.228) | (0.301) | (0.428) |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 |

Table G.4: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Control Age | (2) Interact Age | (3) Control Age | (4) Interact Age |
| Representative Attends | 0.083 | 0.093 | 0.588*** | 0.060 |
| | (0.095) | (0.322) | (0.172) | (0.592) |
| Age | 0.004 | 0.004 | -0.038*** | -0.049*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.009) | (0.015) |
| Representative Attends × Age | | -0.000 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.009) | | (0.019) |
| Constant | 0.490*** | 0.485** | -1.558*** | -1.232*** |
| | (0.167) | (0.222) | (0.303) | (0.463) |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 | 1995 |

Table G.5: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

## G.3 Education

Like age, I treat education as a continuous variable in order to make sure that my results are not driven by education alone. This is particularly important since well-educated citizens are over-represented in my sample, which means if my results are driven by high levels of education they may only hold for that population. When I treat attendance as a binary

| | (1)<br>Control for Age | (2)<br>Interact Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.117 | -1.969** |
| | (0.270) | (0.940) |
| Representative Attends | 0.325 | -1.824** |
| | (0.248) | (0.891) |
| Both Attend | 0.711*** | -0.303 |
| | (0.234) | (0.861) |
| Age | -0.039*** | -0.084*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.024) |
| Mayor Attends × Age | | 0.063** |
| | | (0.031) |
| Representative Attends × Age | | 0.071** |
| | | (0.029) |
| Both Attend × Age | | 0.035 |
| | | (0.029) |
| Constant | -1.482*** | -0.155 |
| | (0.335) | (0.701) |
| Observations | 1995 | 1995 |

Table G.6: Credit for Representative Including Age

variable, I find the expected null results when the mayor attends (see Table G.7. When the representative attends, more educated people are more likely to credit the mayor and those who see the representative are more likely to credit the mayor. However, the interaction is not significant (see Table G.8). As expected, when controlling for education those who see the representative are more likely to credit the representative, but there is no effect when interacting level of education.

Finally, I consider all three possible treatments for attributing credit to the representative. As in the main results, I find that the shared credit treatment is positive and significant when controlling for education. There is no effect of interacting education.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Education | Interact Education | Control Education | Interact Education |
| Mayor Attends | 0.065 | -0.387 | 0.198 | 0.100 |
| | (0.095) | (0.592) | (0.167) | (1.043) |
| Education | 0.031 | 0.014 | -0.007 | -0.011 |
| | (0.023) | (0.032) | (0.040) | (0.059) |
| Mayor Attends × Education | | 0.036 | | 0.008 |
| | | (0.046) | | (0.081) |
| Constant | 0.248 | 0.467 | -2.472*** | -2.419*** |
| | (0.300) | (0.413) | (0.529) | (0.758) |
| Observations | 1999 | 1999 | 1999 | 1999 |

Table G.7: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Education | Interact Education | Control Education | Interact Education |
| Representative Attends | 0.088 | 1.040* | 0.557*** | 0.662 |
| | (0.095) | (0.594) | (0.171) | (1.075) |
| Education | 0.031 | 0.068** | -0.007 | -0.002 |
| | (0.023) | (0.033) | (0.040) | (0.066) |
| Representative Attends × Education | | -0.075 | | -0.008 |
| | | (0.046) | | (0.083) |
| Constant | 0.237 | -0.237 | -2.678*** | -2.743*** |
| | (0.299) | (0.418) | (0.531) | (0.850) |
| Observations | 1999 | 1999 | 1999 | 1999 |

Table G.8: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

## G.4 Household Strata

Colombian households are divided into one of six strata associated with their income. I use household strata in order to make sure income does not drive the results. In the binary tests, I find the expected null results for the mayor attending. However, when controlling for household strata I find that respondents in higher household strata are less likely to attribute credit to the representative (see Table G.10). Likewise, when the representative attends, I continue to find that those who see the representative are more likely to credit the

| | (1)<br>Control for Education | (2)<br>Interact Education |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.073 | 1.063 |
| | (0.269) | (1.701) |
| Representative Attends | 0.326 | 1.409 |
| | (0.247) | (1.550) |
| Both Attend | 0.691*** | 1.014 |
| | (0.233) | (1.509) |
| Education | -0.008 | 0.040 |
| | (0.040) | (0.092) |
| Mayor Attends × Education | | -0.089 |
| | | (0.132) |
| Representative Attends × Education | | -0.085 |
| | | (0.120) |
| Both Attend × Education | | -0.025 |
| | | (0.116) |
| Constant | -2.632*** | -3.253*** |
| | (0.549) | (1.211) |
| Observations | 1999 | 1999 |

Table G.9: Credit for Representative Including Education

representative and those in higher household strata are less likely to credit the representative (see Table G.11). Since my survey sample undersamples those in the first strata, I suspect that the effect of the representative is underestimated.

Finally, when I compare all three treatments with attributing credit to the representative, I find that the shared credit treatment is positive and significant, even when controlling for household strata. Higher strata are still less likely to credit the representative. Moreover, when interacting household strata, I find that the shared credit condition is still positive, while none of the interactions are significant.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Control Strata | (2) Interact Strata | (3) Control Strata | (4) Interact Strata |
| Mayor Attends | 0.069 | -0.157 | 0.191 | 0.604 |
| | (0.095) | (0.266) | (0.167) | (0.465) |
| Strata | 0.074 | 0.034 | -0.261*** | -0.176 |
| | (0.046) | (0.064) | (0.086) | (0.123) |
| Mayor Attends × Strata | | 0.084 | | -0.165 |
| | | (0.092) | | (0.173) |
| Constant | 0.436*** | 0.545*** | -1.878*** | -2.095*** |
| | (0.141) | (0.186) | (0.249) | (0.340) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.10: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Control Strata | (2) Interact Strata | (3) Control Strata | (4) Interact Strata |
| Representative Attends | 0.082 | 0.227 | 0.557*** | 0.545 |
| | (0.095) | (0.266) | (0.172) | (0.475) |
| Strata | 0.074 | 0.100 | -0.260*** | -0.263* |
| | (0.046) | (0.064) | (0.087) | (0.137) |
| Representative Attends × Strata | | -0.054 | | 0.005 |
| | | (0.092) | | (0.177) |
| Constant | 0.428*** | 0.359* | -2.093*** | -2.085*** |
| | (0.142) | (0.185) | (0.256) | (0.368) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.11: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

## G.5 Political Knowledge

In order to consider if the level of political knowledge the respondent has influences their response to the treatment, I asked three political knowledge were, (1) Who is the President? (2) Who is the mayor of your municipality? and (3) What year was the last municipal election?. Most respondents got at least one question correct. I code low knowledge (0) as

| | (1) Control for Strata | (2) Interact Strata |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.092 | 0.428 |
| | (0.269) | (0.737) |
| Representative Attends | 0.314 | 0.315 |
| | (0.247) | (0.687) |
| Both Attend | 0.685*** | 1.098* |
| | (0.233) | (0.650) |
| Strata | -0.262*** | -0.171 |
| | (0.087) | (0.182) |
| Mayor Attends × Strata | | -0.209 |
| | | (0.276) |
| Representative Attends × Strata | | 0.002 |
| | | (0.247) |
| Both Attend × Strata | | -0.162 |
| | | (0.237) |
| Constant | -2.041*** | -2.278*** |
| | (0.288) | (0.512) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.12: Credit for Representative Including Household Strata

those who got none or one of the questions correct, medium knowledge (1) as those who got two questions correct, and high knowledge (2) as those who got all three questions correct.

In the binary tests, I find the expected results when the mayor attends. Notably, political knowledge has no effect on whether people attribute credit to the mayor or the representative (see Table G.13). When the representative attends, respondents are more likely to attribute credit to the representative, even when controlling for knowledge. Moreover, the interaction between the representative attending and knowledge is positive and significant, suggesting that more knowledgeable people have a larger positive effect when the representative attends (see Table G.14).

When I consider all treatments for attributing credit to the representative, I find that when controlling for knowledge the shared credit treatment is positive and significant. How-

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Knowledge | Interact Knowledge | Control Knowledge | Interact Knowledge |
| Mayor Attends | 0.064 | 0.261 | 0.198 | 0.307 |
| | (0.095) | (0.179) | (0.167) | (0.315) |
| Knowledge | 0.047 | 0.137 | -0.047 | 0.008 |
| | (0.069) | (0.097) | (0.120) | (0.180) |
| Mayor Attends × Knowledge | | -0.177 | | -0.099 |
| | | (0.137) | | (0.242) |
| Constant | 0.590*** | 0.491*** | -2.514*** | -2.576*** |
| | (0.101) | (0.126) | (0.180) | (0.237) |
| Observations | 2003 | 2003 | 2003 | 2003 |

Table G.13: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Knowledge | Interact Knowledge | Control Knowledge | Interact Knowledge |
| Representative Attends | 0.081 | 0.194 | 0.563*** | 0.124 |
| | (0.095) | (0.179) | (0.171) | (0.313) |
| Knowledge | 0.046 | 0.096 | -0.056 | -0.307 |
| | (0.069) | (0.096) | (0.121) | (0.194) |
| Representative Attends × Knowledge | | -0.102 | | 0.410* |
| | | (0.137) | | (0.249) |
| Constant | 0.584*** | 0.529*** | -2.716*** | -2.457*** |
| | (0.100) | (0.124) | (0.187) | (0.232) |
| Observations | 2003 | 2003 | 2003 | 2003 |

Table G.14: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

ever, when interacting knowledge, none of the treatments are significant.

## G.6 Voting Behavior

In order to consider whether voters behave differently than non voters, I conduct the analyses considering three different types of voters: those who voted in the municipal elections, those who voted in the national elections, and those who voted in both elections. When the mayor attends, I find the expected null results. However, I also find that those who voted

| | (1) Control Knowledge | (2) Interact Knowledge |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.072 | 0.098 |
| | (0.269) | (0.465) |
| Representative Attends | 0.333 | -0.111 |
| | (0.247) | (0.472) |
| Both Attend | 0.697*** | 0.389 |
| | (0.233) | (0.426) |
| Knowledge | -0.052 | -0.223 |
| | (0.121) | (0.271) |
| Mayor Attends × Knowledge | | -0.172 |
| | | (0.389) |
| Representative Attends × Knowledge | | 0.399 |
| | | (0.365) |
| Both Attend × Knowledge | | 0.287 |
| | | (0.338) |
| Constant | -2.686*** | -2.507*** |
| | (0.226) | (0.330) |
| Observations | 2003 | 2003 |

Table G.15: Credit for Representative Including Household Strata

in the national election are more likely to attribute credit to the mayor ($p < 0.1$) and that the interaction between voting in both the national and municipal elections and the mayor attending is positive at $p < 0.1$ (See Table G.16). When considering credit for the representative, those who vote in the municipal election are less likely to attribute credit to the representative ($p < 0.1$). Moreover, when interacting voting in both elections with the mayor attending, the mayor attending has a positive effect on crediting the representative ($p < 0.1$). These results are in Table G.17.

I also find the expected results when considering whether the representative attends. As seen in Table G.18, when controlling for national voters, those who vote in national elections are more likely to attribute credit to the mayor. When I interact national voters with whether the representative attends, the coefficient for national voters is also positive and significant

($p < 0.01$). As expected, when the representative attends, all types of voters are more likely to attribute credit to the representative (models 1, 3, and 5 in Table G.19). Likewise, when including interactions, those who are not municipal voters are still more likely to attribute credit to the national politician (Model 2). Finally, both municipal voters (Model 1) and natioanl voters (Model 4) are less likely to attribute credit to the representative, but the interaction between being a national voter and the representative attending is positive and significant.

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.072 | -0.125 | 0.065 | -0.091 | 0.062 | -0.181 |
| | (0.095) | (0.175) | (0.096) | (0.206) | (0.096) | (0.162) |
| Vote Municipal | 0.144 | 0.000 | | | | |
| | (0.104) | (0.150) | | | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.280 | | | | |
| | | (0.209) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | 0.218* | 0.116 | | |
| | | | (0.116) | (0.167) | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.200 | | |
| | | | | (0.233) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | 0.131 | -0.058 |
| | | | | | (0.101) | (0.144) |
| Mayor Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.376* |
| | | | | | | (0.202) |
| Constant | 0.544*** | 0.649*** | 0.490*** | 0.572*** | 0.575*** | 0.703*** |
| | (0.101) | (0.129) | (0.114) | (0.149) | (0.095) | (0.119) |
| Observations | 1988 | 1988 | 1957 | 1957 | 1950 | 1950 |

Table G.16: Credit for Mayor if the Mayor Attends

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.179 | 0.370 | 0.203 | 0.081 | 0.207 | 0.524* |
| | (0.168) | (0.293) | (0.169) | (0.346) | (0.169) | (0.285) |
| Vote Municipal | -0.294* | -0.134 | | | | |
| | (0.176) | (0.270) | | | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote Municipal | | -0.287 | | | | |
| | | (0.358) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | -0.209 | -0.296 | | |
| | | | (0.198) | (0.291) | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.160 | | |
| | | | | (0.397) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | -0.161 | 0.120 |
| | | | | | (0.174) | (0.270) |
| Mayor Attends × Vote All | | | | | | -0.499 |
| | | | | | | (0.356) |
| Constant | -2.353*** | -2.465*** | -2.410*** | -2.343*** | -2.467*** | -2.656*** |
| | (0.172) | (0.227) | (0.197) | (0.254) | (0.167) | (0.226) |
| Observations | 1988 | 1988 | 1957 | 1957 | 1950 | 1950 |

Table G.17: Credit for Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Representative Attends | 0.081 | 0.154 | 0.078 | 0.338 | 0.079 | 0.194 |
| | (0.095) | (0.175) | (0.096) | (0.206) | (0.096) | (0.162) |
| Vote Municipal | 0.142 | 0.194 | | | | |
| | (0.104) | (0.147) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | -0.104 | | | | |
| | | (0.208) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | 0.217* | 0.382** | | |
| | | | (0.116) | (0.163) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | -0.332 | | |
| | | | | (0.233) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | 0.131 | 0.220 |
| | | | | | (0.101) | (0.142) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | -0.177 |
| | | | | | | (0.201) |
| Constant | 0.540*** | 0.503*** | 0.484*** | 0.355** | 0.566*** | 0.508*** |
| | (0.100) | (0.124) | (0.114) | (0.144) | (0.095) | (0.115) |
| Observations | 1988 | 1988 | 1957 | 1957 | 1950 | 1950 |

Table G.18: Credit for Mayor if the Representative Attends

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Representative Attends | 0.572*** | 0.519* | 0.581*** | -0.342 | 0.576*** | 0.377 |
| | (0.172) | (0.295) | (0.174) | (0.348) | (0.174) | (0.280) |
| Vote Municipal | -0.291* | -0.341 | | | | |
| | (0.177) | (0.286) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.080 | | | | |
| | | (0.364) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | -0.207 | -0.902*** | | |
| | | | (0.198) | (0.287) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | 1.237*** | | |
| | | | | (0.405) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | -0.152 | -0.348 |
| | | | | | (0.175) | (0.279) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.319 |
| | | | | | | (0.357) |
| Constant | -2.582*** | -2.549*** | -2.630*** | -2.137*** | -2.687*** | -2.565*** |
| | (0.180) | (0.232) | (0.204) | (0.231) | (0.177) | (0.216) |
| Observations | 1988 | 1988 | 1957 | 1957 | 1950 | 1950 |

Table G.19: Credit for Representative if the Representative Attends

Finally, I consider the effect of all treatments on crediting the representative across the three different types of voters in Table G.20. The shared credit treatment is consistently positive and significant, except when interacting national voters with the experimental treatments (model 4). In this model, the interaction between voting in the national election and the shared credit treatment is still positive and significant ($p < 0.05$). Moreover, I find that voting behavior never has a significant effect on attributing credit to the representative.

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.121 | -0.172 | -0.076 | 0.118 | -0.077 | 0.149 |
| | (0.272) | (0.464) | (0.273) | (0.462) | (0.274) | (0.436) |
| Representative Attends | 0.319 | -0.010 | 0.344 | -0.323 | 0.333 | -0.019 |
| | (0.247) | (0.455) | (0.250) | (0.515) | (0.251) | (0.452) |
| Both Attend | 0.682*** | 0.735* | 0.718*** | -0.250 | 0.717*** | 0.787** |
| | (0.233) | (0.400) | (0.236) | (0.481) | (0.236) | (0.394) |
| Vote Municipal | -0.289 | 0.000 | | | | |
| | (0.177) | (.) | | | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.072 | | | | |
| | | (0.573) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.472 | | | | |
| | | (0.542) | | | | |
| Both Attend × Vote Municipal | | -0.095 | | | | |
| | | (0.493) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | -0.193 | 0.000 | | |
| | | | (0.199) | (.) | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote National | | | | -0.309 | | |
| | | | | (0.576) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.883 | | |
| | | | | (0.593) | | |
| Both Attend × Vote National | | | | 1.272** | | |
| | | | | (0.556) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | -0.148 | 0.000 |
| | | | | | (0.175) | (.) |
| Mayor Attends × Vote All | | | | | | -0.396 |
| | | | | | | (0.564) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.523 |
| | | | | | | (0.543) |
| Both Attend × Vote All | | | | | | -0.120 |
| | | | | | | (0.493) |
| Constant | -2.526*** | -2.460*** | -2.604*** | -2.197*** | -2.653*** | -2.646*** |
| | (0.223) | (0.329) | (0.243) | (0.333) | (0.222) | (0.327) |
| Observations | 1988 | 1988 | 1957 | 1957 | 1950 | 1950 |

Table G.20: Credit for Representative Including Voting Behavior

## G.7 Partisans

In this section, I consider whether partisanship has an effect on the experimental result. 449 of 1997 respondents are classified as partisans (22.48%). When the mayor attends, I find all expected null results (see Table G.21). When the representative attends, I see the expected null results for attributing credit to the mayor. Moreover, I consistently find that the representative attending is positive and significant. Partisanship has no effect on credit attribution in any of the models.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship |
| Mayor Attends | 0.063 | 0.047 | 0.196 | 0.166 |
| | (0.095) | (0.107) | (0.167) | (0.193) |
| Partisan | 0.098 | 0.062 | 0.176 | 0.108 |
| | (0.115) | (0.162) | (0.192) | (0.289) |
| Mayor Attends × Partisan | | 0.074 | | 0.122 |
| | | (0.229) | | (0.386) |
| Constant | 0.631*** | 0.638*** | -2.605*** | -2.588*** |
| | (0.071) | (0.075) | (0.131) | (0.140) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.21: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Mayor Attends

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship |
| Representative Attends | 0.086 | 0.089 | 0.560*** | 0.478** |
| | (0.095) | (0.107) | (0.171) | (0.196) |
| Partisan | 0.096 | 0.103 | 0.161 | -0.061 |
| | (0.115) | (0.164) | (0.192) | (0.333) |
| Representative Attends × Partisan | | -0.013 | | 0.345 |
| | | (0.229) | | (0.409) |
| Constant | 0.620*** | 0.618*** | -2.811*** | -2.762*** |
| | (0.071) | (0.075) | (0.142) | (0.150) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.22: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

When looking to see which treatment drives the result for representatives, my results continue to be consistent with my main tests. When controlling for partisanship, the shared

credit condition is positive and significant. When interacting partisanship, the shared credit condition is still positive and significant. Moreover, the interaction between the representative credit condition and being a partisan is positive.

| | (1)<br>Control Partisanship | (2)<br>Interact Partisanship |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | -0.072 | -0.284 |
| | (0.269) | (0.304) |
| Representative Attends | 0.332 | 0.086 |
| | (0.247) | (0.280) |
| Both Attend | 0.693*** | 0.570** |
| | (0.233) | (0.258) |
| Partisan | 0.153 | -0.637 |
| | (0.192) | (0.547) |
| Mayor Attends × Partisan | | 1.056 |
| | | (0.698) |
| Representative Attends × Partisan | | 1.162* |
| | | (0.652) |
| Both Attend × Partisan | | 0.715 |
| | | (0.634) |
| Constant | -2.774*** | -2.631*** |
| | (0.191) | (0.199) |
| Observations | 1997 | 1997 |

Table G.23: Credit for Representative Including Partisanship

# H Credit Claiming and Vote Share- Alternative Operalizations

In this section, I repeat the analyses for how credit claiming behavior affects the anticipated future vote shares of the mayor and representative using two alternative measurements for future vote share. First, I consider a dichotomized measure coded 1 if the respondent anticipated the vote share of the politician improving the next time they ran for office and

0 otherwise. Second, I use the original five point scale ranging from 1- the politician will receive a lot fewer votes - to 5- the politician will receive a lot more votes. This measurement moves beyond improving or not to considering how much the future share may change by.

In order to be consistent with the reported results, I expect that the representative attending will have no effect on the mayor's anticipated future vote share. However, if the representative attends I expect that the representative's anticipated future vote share should improve.

## H.1 Binary Analyses

### Dichotomized Measure

Using the dichotomized measurement, the mean of each group can be interpreted as the proportion of respondents who anticipate the politician's vote share improving. When the representative attends, the proportion of respondents who anticipate the mayor's vote share improving is unchanged. However, when the representative attends the proportion of representatives who anticipate the representative's vote share will improve increases from 0.58 to 0.65. This change is significant at $p < 0.05$ and is consistent with the trichotomous measure.

### Five- Point Scale

Using the original five-point scale, the mean of each group is a value in the interval of 1 to 5 reflecting the amount of change in vote share. When the representative attends, there is no difference in anticipated future vote shares between the two groups. However, when the representative attends, the group who saw the representative is more likely to anticipate that the representative's vote share will improve. The mean of respondents increases from 3.59 to 3.74. This difference is significant at $p < 0.05$.

## H.2 Compare All Treatments

Using the original trichotomized measure, I find that the representative credit claiming condition is positive and significant at $p < 0.1$. Moreover, an ANOVA analysis shows that the four groups are different and that the largest differences occur between those exposed to the mayor treatment and those exposed to either the representative credit or the shared credit treatments.

### Dichotomized Measure

Using the dichotomized measure, I find consistent results with the trichotomized measure. None of the treatments have a statistically significant effect on whether the mayor's vote share improves. Moreover, the representative treatment has a positive and statistically significant effect on the anticipated future vote share of the representative ($p < 0.1$). As with the trichotomized measure, the ANOVA test is significant ($p < 0.05$) and the results are driven by the differences between the mayor attending treatment and the representative attending or shared credit treatments.

### Five-Point Scale

Using the continuous five point scale, I find consistent results with the trichotomized measure. None of the treatments have a statistically significant effect on the mayor's anticipated vote share. However, none of the treatments are significant for the representative when using a five-point scale that introduces more variation in responses. Despite this, the ANOVA analysis still shows that the four groups are different ($p < 0.05$) and paired t-tests confirm that this is driven by the differences between the mayor treatment and the representative or shared credit treatments.

# I Credit Claiming and Vote Share- Analyses by Good

In this section, I repeat both the binary tests and the test by good using the trichotomized measure for each possible good.

## I.1 Binary Analyses

In the pooled analysis, I found that the representative attending has no effect on responses for the mayor's anticipated future vote share. However, I found that the representative attends, the respondent's are more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share will improve (on a scale of -1 to 1, the mean will be closer to 1).

#### Schools

Unlike in the pooled analysis, if the representative attends there is no effect on the mayor or the representative's anticipated future vote share.

#### Clinic

As in the pooled analysis, if the representative attends there is no effect on the mayor's anticipated vote share. However, the expected vote change for the representative is higher ($p < 0.05$).

#### Road

The results change slightly when considering the roads condition. If the representative attends, respondents are more likely to anticipate the mayor's vote share improving ($p < 0.1$). Moreover, as expected, respondents are more likely to anticipate that the representative's vote share will improve ($p < 0.05$).

## I.2 Compare All Treatments

In the pooled analysis, the results were driven by the representative attends treatment ($p < 0.1$). When looking at the results using an ANOVA analysis, I found the largest differences are between the mayor treatment and either the representative or shared credit treatments.

### Schools

Unlike in the pooled analysis, the ordered logit regressions suggests that no treatments are significant. Moreover, the ANOVA analysis is not significant. Thus, credit claiming for schools does not seem to have an effect on anticipated vote shares.

### Clinic

The clinic condition also differs from the pooled analysis. First, if the respondent is exposed to the mayor credit claiming condition, they are more likely to anticipate the mayor's future vote share improving ($p < 0.01$). This effect also occurs when respondents are exposed to the shared credit treatment ($p < 0.1$). Conversely, none of the treatments have a significant effect for the representative and the ANOVA test is not significant.

### Road

As expected, in the road condition none of the treatments have a statistically significant effect on the anticipated future vote shares of the mayor. Surprisingly, when considering the representative, if the respondent is exposed to the mayor credit claiming condition they are more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share getting worse ($p < 0.1$). This is surprising since there were no consequences for mayoral credit claiming across other treatments. As in the pooled analysis, the ANOVA test confirms that the four groups are different. When considering the pooled t-tests, the mean of the trichotomous measure for vote change is lower when the mayor attends than in the control ($p < 0.1$). Finally, as expected, the measure for

vote change is higher in the representative attends or the shared credit treatment than the mayor attends treatment ($p < 0.05$).

# J Credit Claiming and Vote Share- Controlling for Demographic Features

In the following section, I analyze how gender, age, education, household strata, political knowledge, voting behavior, and partisanship influence the results. For each category, I conduct tests where I control for the demographic characteristic as its own variable and where I interact the demographic with each treatment. For all analyses, I use the trichotomized measure for anticipated future vote share.

## J.1 Gender

In the main analysis, whether the representative attends does not have an effect on the expected change in the mayor's vote share. However, when the representative attends, respondents are more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving.

When I separate binary results by gender, I find consistent results for the anticipated change in vote share for the mayor. However, I find that males are unlikely to anticipate a change in vote share for the representative if the representative attends. This suggests that the results are driven by the change among female respondents.

| | Representative Does Not Attend | Representative Attends | p-value | Consistent with Main Analysis? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Expected Vote Change Mayor Male | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.58 | Yes |
| Expected Vote Change Mayor Female | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.98 | Yes |
| Expected Vote Change Representative Male | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.21 | No |
| Expected Vote Change Representative Female | 0.39 | 0.56 | 0.008 | Yes |

Table J.1: Binary Tests by Gender if the Representative Attends

I also repeat the comparison across all four treatments using both controlling for gender and interacting each treatment with gender. In the main analysis, I find that the representative claiming credit is significant at $p < 0.1$ while the ANOVA test shows the experimental

treatments are different at $p < 0.05$.

| | (1)<br>Control for Gender | (2)<br>Interact Gender |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.065 | 0.307 |
| | (0.205) | (0.277) |
| Representative Attends | 0.240 | 0.518* |
| | (0.204) | (0.271) |
| Both Attend | 0.110 | 0.476* |
| | (0.204) | (0.267) |
| Male | 0.005 | 0.542* |
| | (0.146) | (0.300) |
| Mayor Attends × Male | | -0.584 |
| | | (0.418) |
| Representative Attends × Male | | -0.665 |
| | | (0.417) |
| Both Attend × Male | | -0.890** |
| | | (0.418) |
| Constant | 0.923*** | 0.704*** |
| | (0.158) | (0.184) |
| Observations | 989 | 989 |

Table J.2: Anticipated Vote Change for Representative Including Gender

When controlling for gender, there are no longer significant results. However, when interacting gender, the results are more consistent. When the representative attends or both politicians attend, respondents are more likely to anticipate a higher vote share for the representative ($p < 0.1$). However, the interaction for the shared credit treatment and male respondents is negative ($p < 0.01$). Finally, the ANOVA test suggests that the four possible treatments are only different for women ($p < 0.1$).

## J.2 Age

In order to make sure my results are not driven by age, I operationalize age as a continuous variable. In the first table, I consider whether the anticipated future vote shares of the

mayor and representative change when the representative attends. I both control for age and interact age. I find the expected null results for the mayor's vote change. However, when controlling for age I no longer find an effect of the representative attending on anticipated future votes for the representative. When I interact age, I do still find that respondents are more likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving when the representative attends ($p < 0.1$).

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Age | Interact Age | Control Age | Interact Age |
| Representative Attends | 0.068 | 0.635 | 0.128 | 0.894* |
| | (0.185) | (0.627) | (0.145) | (0.494) |
| Age | 0.009 | 0.017 | -0.000 | 0.011 |
| | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.007) | (0.010) |
| Representative Attends × Age | | -0.017 | | -0.023 |
| | | (0.018) | | (0.014) |
| Constant | 1.519*** | 1.253*** | 0.965*** | 0.599* |
| | (0.321) | (0.425) | (0.256) | (0.340) |
| Observations | 997 | 997 | 983 | 983 |

Table J.3: Anticipated Vote Change for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

In the next set of tables, I repeat the analysis across all four possible treatment groups for attributing credit to the representative. When I control for age, none of the treatments are significant. When interacting age, I find the shared credit treatment is positive ($p < 0.05$) and the interaction between the shared credit treatment and age is negative ($p < 0.05$).

## J.3 Education

Like age, I treat education as a continuous variable in order to make sure that my results are not driven by education alone. This is particularly important since well-educated citizens are over-represented in my sample, which means if my results are driven by high levels of education they may only hold for that population. When the representative attends, I find

| | (1) Control for Age | (2) Interact Age |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.075 | 0.065 |
| | (0.206) | (0.685) |
| Representative Attends | 0.225 | 0.323 |
| | (0.204) | (0.706) |
| Both Attend | 0.104 | 1.667** |
| | (0.204) | (0.743) |
| Age | 0.000 | 0.011 |
| | (0.007) | (0.014) |
| Mayor Attends × Age | | 0.001 |
| | | (0.020) |
| Representative Attends × Age | | -0.003 |
| | | (0.020) |
| Both Attend × Age | | -0.045** |
| | | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.923*** | 0.554 |
| | (0.281) | (0.505) |
| Observations | 983 | 983 |

Table J.4: Anticipated Vote for Representative Including Age

the expected null results for anticipated changes in the mayor's vote share. Moreover, when I control for education I find that more educated respondents are less likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving. However, the representative attending has no effect.

Finally, I consider all three possible treatments for attributing credit to the representative. I continue to find that more educated respondents are less likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving. Moreover, there is no effect when interacting the treatments with education.

## J.4 Household Strata

Colombian households are divided into one of six strata associated with their income. I use household strata in order to make sure income does not drive the results. I find that

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Education | Interact Education | Control Education | Interact Education |
| Representative Attends | 0.084 | 0.027 | 0.143 | -1.019 |
| | (0.185) | (1.151) | (0.145) | (0.967) |
| Education | 0.008 | 0.005 | -0.098*** | -0.142*** |
| | (0.044) | (0.063) | (0.037) | (0.052) |
| Representative Attends × Education | | 0.004 | | 0.090 |
| | | (0.089) | | (0.074) |
| Constant | 1.700*** | 1.728** | 2.213*** | 2.775*** |
| | (0.581) | (0.814) | (0.490) | (0.685) |
| Observations | 996 | 996 | 988 | 988 |

Table J.5: Anticipated Future Votes for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

| | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
| | Control for Education | Interact Education |
| Mayor Attends | 0.054 | 2.116 |
| | (0.206) | (1.389) |
| Representative Attends | 0.226 | 0.058 |
| | (0.205) | (1.311) |
| Both Attend | 0.112 | -0.135 |
| | (0.205) | (1.373) |
| Education | -0.098*** | -0.066 |
| | (0.037) | (0.071) |
| Mayor Attends × Education | | -0.159 |
| | | (0.106) |
| Representative Attends × Education | | 0.013 |
| | | (0.101) |
| Both Attend × Education | | 0.019 |
| | | (0.106) |
| Constant | 2.177*** | 1.773* |
| | (0.502) | (0.927) |
| Observations | 988 | 988 |

Table J.6: Anticipated Vote for Representative Including Education

respondents in higher strata are less likely to anticipate the representative's vote share improving. Moreover, I no longer find an effect of the representative attending an inauguration ceremony.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Strata | Interact Strata | Control Strata | Interact Strata |
| Representative Attends | 0.091 | 0.548 | 0.142 | 0.424 |
| | (0.185) | (0.520) | (0.145) | (0.417) |
| Strata | -0.010 | 0.061 | -0.132* | -0.080 |
| | (0.087) | (0.117) | (0.071) | (0.101) |
| Representative Attends × Strata | | -0.165 | | -0.102 |
| | | (0.175) | | (0.141) |
| Constant | 1.829*** | 1.635*** | 1.322*** | 1.177*** |
| | (0.269) | (0.338) | (0.223) | (0.300) |
| Observations | 995 | 995 | 987 | 987 |

Table J.7: Anticipated Vote Change for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

Finally, when I compare all three treatments with attributing credit to the representative, I find that the household strata is negative and significant at $p < 0.1$. None of the treatments are significant for understanding potential increases in votes.

## J.5 Political Knowledge

In order to consider if the level of political knowledge the respondent has influences their response to the treatment, I asked three political knowledge were, (1) Who is the President? (2) Who is the mayor of your municipality? and (3) What year was the last municipal election?. Most respondents got at least one question correct. I code low knowledge (0) as those who got none or one of the questions correct, medium knowledge (1) as those who got two questions correct, and high knowledge (2) as those who got all three questions correct.

I never find an effect of the representative attending or political knowledge.

| | (1) Control for Strata | (2) Interact Strata |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.063 | 0.772 |
| | (0.205) | (0.605) |
| Representative Attends | 0.242 | 0.926 |
| | (0.205) | (0.601) |
| Both Attend | 0.105 | 0.757 |
| | (0.205) | (0.609) |
| Strata | -0.131* | 0.063 |
| | (0.071) | (0.154) |
| Mayor Attends × Strata | | -0.255 |
| | | (0.205) |
| Representative Attends × Strata | | -0.250 |
| | | (0.208) |
| Both Attend × Strata | | -0.236 |
| | | (0.209) |
| Constant | 1.288*** | 0.752* |
| | (0.245) | (0.444) |
| Observations | 987 | 987 |

Table J.8: Anticiapted Vote Change for Representative Including Household Strata

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Control Knowledge | (2) Interact Knowledge | (3) Control Knowledge | (4) Interact Knowledge |
| Representative Attends | 0.077 | 0.013 | 0.144 | 0.091 |
| | (0.184) | (0.352) | (0.145) | (0.275) |
| Knowledge | 0.000 | -0.027 | -0.008 | -0.031 |
| | (0.134) | (0.183) | (0.105) | (0.148) |
| Representative Attends × Knowledge | | 0.058 | | 0.047 |
| | | (0.268) | | (0.209) |
| Constant | 1.803*** | 1.833*** | 0.966*** | 0.992*** |
| | (0.195) | (0.241) | (0.154) | (0.194) |
| Observations | 999 | 999 | 989 | 989 |

Table J.9: Anticipated Vote Change for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

When I consider all treatments for attributing credit to the representative, I continue to find no significant results.

| | (1) Control Knowledge | (2) Interact Knowledge |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.065 | 0.334 |
| | (0.205) | (0.389) |
| Representative Attends | 0.241 | 0.046 |
| | (0.204) | (0.394) |
| Both Attend | 0.110 | 0.483 |
| | (0.204) | (0.394) |
| Knowledge | -0.011 | 0.101 |
| | (0.105) | (0.219) |
| Mayor Attends × Knowledge | | -0.243 |
| | | (0.298) |
| Representative Attends × Knowledge | | 0.163 |
| | | (0.305) |
| Both Attend × Knowledge | | -0.337 |
| | | (0.303) |
| Constant | 0.937*** | 0.815*** |
| | (0.185) | (0.279) |
| Observations | 989 | 989 |

Table J.10: Anticipated Vote Change for Representative Including Household Strata

## J.6 Voting Behavior

In order to consider whether voters behave differently than non voters, I conduct the analyses considering three different types of voters: those who voted in the municipal elections, those who voted in the national elections, and those who voted in both elections. As expected, neither voting nor the representative attending have an effect on the anticipated vote change for the mayor. However, the same is true when considering anticipated future votes of the representative.

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Representative Attends | 0.084 | 0.023 | 0.103 | -0.182 | 0.093 | -0.015 |
| | (0.186) | (0.339) | (0.187) | (0.383) | (0.188) | (0.303) |
| Vote Municipal | 0.157 | 0.116 | | | | |
| | (0.202) | (0.280) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.088 | | | | |
| | | (0.405) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | 0.305 | 0.119 | | |
| | | | (0.219) | (0.314) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.375 | | |
| | | | | (0.439) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | 0.292 | 0.210 |
| | | | | | (0.193) | (0.266) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.175 |
| | | | | | | (0.386) |
| Constant | 1.696*** | 1.726*** | 1.552*** | 1.699*** | 1.609*** | 1.662*** |
| | (0.191) | (0.237) | (0.212) | (0.281) | (0.176) | (0.214) |
| Observations | 992 | 992 | 976 | 976 | 971 | 971 |

Table J.11: Anticipate Vote Change for Mayor if the Representative Attends

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Representative Attends | 0.169 | 0.268 | 0.186 | -0.237 | 0.196 | 0.093 |
| | (0.145) | (0.272) | (0.146) | (0.319) | (0.146) | (0.248) |
| Vote Municipal | -0.095 | -0.025 | | | | |
| | (0.161) | (0.228) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | -0.139 | | | | |
| | | (0.322) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | 0.016 | -0.257 | | |
| | | | (0.179) | (0.261) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.535 | | |
| | | | | (0.359) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | -0.020 | -0.100 |
| | | | | | (0.154) | (0.220) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.159 |
| | | | | | | (0.308) |
| Constant | 1.014*** | 0.964*** | 0.922*** | 1.139*** | 0.944*** | 0.999*** |
| | (0.155) | (0.193) | (0.174) | (0.235) | (0.145) | (0.181) |
| Observations | 983 | 983 | 968 | 968 | 966 | 966 |

Table J.12: Anticipated Vote Change for Representative if the Representative Attends

Finally, I consider the effect of all treatments on the anticipated vote share of the representative across the three different types of voters in Table J.13. I find particularly interesting results when accounting for voting behavior. When controlling voters in municipal elections, national elections, or both, none of the treatments are significant, nor is voting. However, when I include interactions these results change. For municipal voters, the mayor credit treatment reduces the likelihood of anticipating the representative's vote share improving, but the interaction between the mayor treatment and being a voter is positive and significant. For voters in the national election, the interaction between the shared credit treatment and being a national voter is positive and significant. Finally, for those who vote in both elections, the mayor attending is negative ($p < 0.1$), again suggesting that the mayor claiming credit harms the potential future vote share of the representative. However, the interaction between the mayor attending and voting in both elections is positive ($p < 0.05$).

| | (1) Municipal Voter | (2) Interact Municipal | (3) National Voter | (4) Interact National | (5) Voter | (6) Interact Voter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.050 | -0.796** | 0.054 | -0.632 | 0.048 | -0.693* |
| | (0.205) | (0.406) | (0.206) | (0.475) | (0.206) | (0.373) |
| Representative Attends | 0.246 | -0.110 | 0.275 | -0.330 | 0.275 | -0.241 |
| | (0.204) | (0.433) | (0.206) | (0.494) | (0.206) | (0.382) |
| Both Attend | 0.140 | -0.264 | 0.147 | -0.714 | 0.162 | -0.342 |
| | (0.206) | (0.411) | (0.207) | (0.448) | (0.208) | (0.371) |
| Vote Municipal | -0.098 | 0.000 | | | | |
| | (0.161) | (.) | | | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote Municipal | | 1.172** | | | | |
| | | (0.474) | | | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote Municipal | | 0.459 | | | | |
| | | (0.492) | | | | |
| Both Attend × Vote Municipal | | 0.519 | | | | |
| | | (0.477) | | | | |
| Vote National | | | 0.008 | 0.000 | | |
| | | | (0.179) | (.) | | |
| Mayor Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.858 | | |
| | | | | (0.528) | | |
| Representative Attends × Vote National | | | | 0.755 | | |
| | | | | (0.543) | | |
| Both Attend × Vote National | | | | 1.111** | | |
| | | | | (0.507) | | |
| Vote All | | | | | -0.023 | 0.000 |
| | | | | | (0.154) | (.) |
| Mayor Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 1.088** |
| | | | | | | (0.450) |
| Representative Attends × Vote All | | | | | | 0.730 |
| | | | | | | (0.455) |
| Both Attend × Vote All | | | | | | 0.720 |
| | | | | | | (0.451) |
| Constant | 0.992*** | 1.427*** | 0.901*** | 1.459*** | 0.923*** | 1.386*** |
| | (0.188) | (0.321) | (0.200) | (0.351) | (0.179) | (0.289) |
| Observations | 983 | 983 | 968 | 968 | 966 | 966 |

Table J.13: Anticipated Vote Change for Representative Including Voting Behavior

## J.7 Partisans

In this section, I consider whether partisanship has an effect on the experimental result. 449 of 1997 respondents are classified as partisans (22.48%). When the representative attends, I find that partisans are more likely to anticipate the mayor's vote share improving ($p < 0.1$) when controlling for partisanship. However, this effect does not exist when interacting partisanship. Moreover, neither partisanship nor the representative attending have an effect on the anticipated vote change of the representative.

| | Mayor | | Representative | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship | Control Partisanship | Interact Partisanship |
| Representative Attends | 0.051 | -0.032 | 0.154 | 0.163 |
| | (0.185) | (0.204) | (0.145) | (0.165) |
| Partisan | 0.454* | 0.231 | -0.053 | -0.033 |
| | (0.242) | (0.327) | (0.173) | (0.245) |
| Representative Attends × Partisan | | 0.467 | | -0.041 |
| | | (0.488) | | (0.347) |
| Constant | 1.721*** | 1.758*** | 0.967*** | 0.962*** |
| | (0.131) | (0.139) | (0.110) | (0.116) |
| Observations | 997 | 997 | 987 | 987 |

Table J.14: Credit for Mayor or Representative if the Representative Attends

When considering all three treatment conditions I have the same null results. Neither partisanship, nor any of the treatments, are significant.

| | (1)<br>Control Partisanship | (2)<br>Interact Partisanship |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor Attends | 0.060 | 0.047 |
| | (0.205) | (0.233) |
| Representative Attends | 0.240 | 0.277 |
| | (0.204) | (0.232) |
| Both Attend | 0.126 | 0.091 |
| | (0.205) | (0.232) |
| Partisan | -0.052 | -0.064 |
| | (0.173) | (0.348) |
| Mayor Attends × Partisan | | 0.059 |
| | | (0.490) |
| Representative Attends × Partisan | | -0.172 |
| | | (0.490) |
| Both Attend × Partisan | | 0.156 |
| | | (0.493) |
| Constant | 0.937*** | 0.939*** |
| | (0.149) | (0.164) |
| Observations | 987 | 987 |

Table J.15: Credit for Representative Including Partisanship